There has been an undoubted rise in right-wing populism globally over the last decade. From the rise of Trump to the growing popularity of right-wing populist parties across Europe, this trend is both quantitatively and qualitatively unmistakable. While there has been extensive analysis of this global political transformation, comparatively little attention has been given to a new form of popular politics. A counterreaction on the left to the rise of right-wing populism.
Although politics has traditionally been analysed within a two-dimensional framework, the following leftist leaders challenge this conventional model by employing "unconventional" left-wing rhetoric and policies to garner support. From Claudia Sheinbaum's libertarian leftist and republican austerity policies, to Andy Burnham's regional left-wing populism, this article endeavours to provide a preliminary analysis of some of the unconventional leftist political approaches that are becoming increasingly electorally popular on the global stage.
“Left-libertarianism” - The Morena Party and Claudia Sheinbaum
Claudia Sheinbaum is one of, if not the most popular, democratically elected political leader on the planet. In the 2024 Mexican election, she broke the record for the highest number of votes ever received by a Mexican candidate, securing 36 million votes, and has consistently maintained approval ratings above 70% since the beginning of her presidency. While her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, was also incredibly popular with the Mexican electorate, Claudia Sheinbaum has taken that popularity to a whole new level.
Reform of economic policy has been the primary focus of both Obrador and now Sheinbaum. Since Morena came to power, both leaders have focused heavily on pre-distributive economic policies rather than redistributive tax policies. Not only is this approach statistically more popular with their working and middle-class base, but it is also effective in that it does not alienate Mexico's political and economic elites to the same extent that redistributive taxation does. Policies such as increasing the minimum wage, which Sheinbaum has raised by more than 20% since her inauguration, along with a range of labour reforms, have also proven highly popular.
However, to fund increased public spending, the Morena Party under Sheinbaum did not raise taxes, like a traditional centre left party would, instead following a policy that Obrador termed "republican austerity". This policy aimed to reduce unnecessary government spending and redirect those savings towards social welfare and infrastructure projects, such as the House-to-House Health Program, the Rita Cetina Gutiérrez Universal Scholarship Program, and a renewed focus on Mexico's rail infrastructure, including the completion of the Tren Maya and the expansion of other rail projects since her presidency began. Sheinbaum has also increased tax revenue by cracking down on tax evasion, shell companies and fuel smuggling, measures estimated to save the Mexican government billions of dollars while crucially avoiding the need for higher headline tax rates to finance Morena's reforms.
This uniquely "left-libertarian" policy platform has proven popular with the Mexican electorate and differs from that of many traditional left-wing parties. Mexico's debt-to-GDP ratio is falling steadily, while government spending accounts for only 29% of annual GDP, a considerably lower proportion than in many comparable Central and South American states. At least for now, it seems that Mexicans prefer a smaller, more efficient state.
The Mexican electorate too has praised Sheinbaum, for her dealings with Donald Trump, managing pragmatic cooperation on shared foreign policy objectives while maintaining Mexican sovereignty and national interests, even receiving praise from Trump himself. She has implemented a crackdown on narcotics in Mexico, a policy Trump has openly endorsed. However, when Mexico was slapped with tariffs of 10% to 25% on certain industries, Sheinbaum responded with her own counter-tariffs, while also negotiating with Trump to get rid of them. She threatened to diversify Mexico’s trade relationships and use improved Mexican border security as a negotiating tool. She has also simultaneously stood firm in defending Mexico’s national interests, by refusing US military operations on Mexican soil against the cartels, defending Mexico’s right to export vital oil and humanitarian aid to Cuba, and refusing Trump’s Board of Peace proposal for Gaza. In the foreign policy realm, Sheinbaum has flourished as a pragmatic leader in a tumultuous and geopolitically unstable time.
She and the Morena Party have also correctly recognised that Mexican society, with its religious and cultural traditions, would not allow a form of "woke" politics to flourish. Her predecessor, Obrador, publicly criticised what he called "vibes progressives", arguing that they had forgotten the central tenet of leftism: greater economic equality. However, Sheinbaum has differed from her predecessor on Mexico's domestic security challenges by taking a tougher stance on organised crime and homicide in major cities. Through police and intelligence reforms, alongside targeted security operations, she has cultivated the image of a relatively tough-on-crime president. This distinguishes her from many left-leaning leaders globally, who are often perceived as weak on crime, and could provide a successful policy model for Western centre-left politicians to emulate.
For Sheinbaum, the Morena Party and its supporters, leftism must return to its economic policy roots while remaining flexible on foreign policy and domestic social issues. Her leftist libertarian policy platform should be treated as a serious framework for established leftist parties to emulate.
“Left-conservatism” - The BSW and Sahra Wagenknecht
Sahra Wagenknecht is a name that needs no introduction in German politics. An outspoken PhD political theorist, long-time hardline leftist, and former Die Linke leader, Wagenknecht has recently broken away to form her own party, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW). Wagenknecht and her new party are an example of "left conservatism". A return to strong public investment and workers' rights, combined with socially conservative domestic policies such as scrapping net zero, advocating an end to mass migration in Germany, and pursuing a realist foreign policy centred on rapprochement with Russia and NATO scepticism. The BSW provides a unique policy alternative to the German electorate, offering a movement that transcends traditional left-right divides.
Unlike Morena, the BSW openly espouses plans for a larger redistributive German state. Wagenknecht has long criticised market economics, believing that it inevitably concentrates wealth in too few hands at the expense of most Germans. The BSW not only supports higher taxes on the ultra-wealthy, but also seeks to increase inheritance and other wealth taxes while simultaneously advocating lower tax burdens for workers and pensioners. Furthermore, Wagenknecht and her party aim to nationalise key industries, strengthen collective bargaining agreements, and implement a quasi-Bismarckian social insurance state.
Wagenknecht, unlike many of her economically left-leaning compatriots, holds relatively right-leaning social views. She is vehemently opposed to mass migration, seeing a large influx of migrants as a mechanism that suppresses the wages of working Germans while placing additional strain on the welfare state. She also views Germany's push towards net zero as a fundamental misstep, fearing that a green German economy will leave behind the poorer eastern regions from which she hails and which she now represents. She is perhaps best known, however, as a strident anti-woke advocate, arguing that the rise of so-called "lifestyle leftists" has diverted the left's attention towards symbolic social equality issues rather than the central pillar of leftist politics: economic equality and justice. Much like Obrador in Mexico, she has criticised left liberalism, feminism, and intersectionalism, viewing these movements as the preoccupations of affluent inner-city urbanites who focus on moral posturing rather than the concerns of the traditional left-wing voter, the German working class. It is therefore no surprise that her book, “The Self-Righteous” blames the radical social left for the growing support among German workers for far-right parties such as AfD.
Wagenknecht and her party also espouse a unique foreign policy position within Germany, advocating détente with Russia alongside NATO scepticism. Since the Ukraine-Russia conflict began, Wagenknecht has consistently criticised German military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, arguing that such policies directly contradict Germany's national interest. She believes that Russian gas imports remain integral to Germany's immediate energy future and that NATO expansion has been a net negative for European security since the end of the Cold War. Her neutral and realist approach to German foreign policy is therefore internally consistent and has become an increasingly popular position within Germany as the Ukraine-Russia war continues into its fourth devastating year.
At its first electoral contest in May 2024, the party won 6.2% of the vote in the European Parliament elections. It subsequently secured between 11% and 16% of the vote in the state elections in Saxony, Brandenburg, and Thuringia, the latter of which it still governs as part of a coalition. While the party fell just short of the 5% threshold required to secure representation in the Bundestag, the fact that a party less than two years old was able to galvanise such a substantial electoral base demonstrates that the BSW possesses a broadly popular policy platform.
Although the party and Wagenknecht have struggled to establish strong local organisational roots and have more recently suffered the electoral drawbacks typical of a "cult of personality" party, the level of support she has attracted from voters across both the German left and right suggests considerable potential for future electoral success. Her and her party represent a left movement that successfully fills a “representation gap” within the German polity, a strategy that other leftist movements could adopt to fill their own respective representation gaps.
“Regional populism” - Soft Labour and Andy Burnham
The election of Andy Burnham as British Prime Minister could herald a new era of change for British politics. Burnham is by far one of the most popular political leaders in Britain, and his outwardly personable and communicative skills far exceed those of the previous Labour leader, Keir Starmer. Burnham is a unique figure within the Labour Party, in that he espouses a unique form of populism. Regional populism. Unlike the populists of the European far right and far left, Burnham chooses geography as his primary basis for opposing the mainstream political institutions in London. Burnham’s communication strategy has been uniquely populist in that, instead of rallying around a mainstream political orthodoxy, he instead focuses on place-based politics, the divide between London and the remaining localities in regional Britain, and the polarised political climate present in the country. His unique brand of soft Labour populism aims to address two primary issues; political decentralisation and greater public expenditure in much needed sectors of the economy.
Regarding devolution and the decentralisation of power away from London, Burnham has an enviable record. While previously an MP for Leigh in Westminster, he became a champion of northern politics by pressing the centralised government in London to do more for the victims of the Hillsborough disaster. During his time as Mayor of Manchester, he has led a renaissance of the city, particularly by focusing on greater infrastructure, cheaper public transport, and decreasing the daily living costs of ordinary Mancunians. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Burnham earned himself the reputation of “the King of the North” due to his combative attitude towards Boris Johnson’s pandemic policies and what Burnham perceived as a two-tier system, with the South East and London receiving greater funding relief compared to Manchester and the British north. In his first days as Prime Minister, Burnham has even instituted a “Number 10 North”, a prime ministerial office representing greater devolution and promoting policy and economic decentralisation away from London.
Burnham’s plan now as Prime Minister of Britain centres around “Manchesterism”, the broad implementation and nationalisation of his policies for Manchester. Burnham’s Labour economic policies are no exception to this. He has been on record saying that the Thatcherite policies of the 1980s, including greater privatisation, deindustrialisation and centralisation, have led to a Britain that is highly unequal and characterised by low growth. He plans to focus heavily on public investment in infrastructure, as Britain has consistently ranked as the lowest nation in the G7 regarding public investment in infrastructure over the last three decades. He is pushing for a large underground Manchester station to link High Speed 2, a key transnational rail project, and has pledged a national cap on bus fare prices, again a carbon copy of the popular policy he implemented as Mayor of Manchester. Burnham also aims to reform the government’s “Green Book” appraisal and evaluation system, the framework by which the government assesses the return on investment for proposed infrastructure projects. He aims to change the structural framework of the Green Book from a Benefit-Cost Ratio metric to a system that accounts for place-based analysis, meaning urban, rural and geographically disparate areas of Britain are not all compared against a single national average. This should, in theory, incentivise government investment in infrastructure projects towards less developed areas of Britain.
Burnham has also implemented other left-leaning policies in the early days of his premiership. On his first day as Prime Minister, Burnham pledged £340 million to end rough sleeping across Britain, contributing to 1,200 homes and providing support services to 3,000 homeless individuals. Burnham has signalled education reform as a priority for his government. He seeks to reintroduce vocational and technical training initiatives and curricula to better incorporate young people into the workforce, alongside a desperate need to re-envisage a university-obsessed culture, a signal to the British electorate that the Labour Party is refocussing on its working class roots. Lastly, Burnham has indicated his intent to focus on a new social care initiative, modelling something akin to the NHS but strictly for adult social care called the National Care Service. This is needed, as Britain, like most Western and first-world nations, is experiencing a rapidly ageing population and increased pressure and friction in managing the care requirements this reality poses.
While it should be stressed that we are only at the starting point of Burnham’s premiership, it seems to be electorally working. Already, Burnham remains the most popular politician in the country, with 37% of the British public having a favourable opinion of him. While a general election will be the ultimate proof in the pudding for Burnham’s regional leftist model, and it is almost certain that he has enjoyed a new-PM boost, the statistics currently show that he is in a favourable position to retain government. The fact that Burnham is almost ten points higher than Keir Starmer in personal PM approval, and has increased Labour’s favourability rating by the same margin when it comes to party approval statistics, suggests that his model offers something unique and broadly popular to the British electorate.
Leftist parties worldwide would be wise to implement many of the unique merits and communication strategies that Burnham's regional populism provides, especially in an era of increasing urbanisation and political centralisation.
“Postive leftism” - The Democratic Socialists of America, Zohran Mamdani and Abdul El-Sayed
For almost a decade, the Democratic Party in the United States has been in turmoil. Yet, ever since Senator Bernie Sanders’ serious presidential campaign in 2016, the left wing of the party has had a campaign model to emulate. While Democratic Socialists of America candidates such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib experienced an undeniable increase in electoral success during the first Trump presidency, their platforms were largely centred on left-leaning social and environmental issues, including the Black Lives Matter movement and the Green New Deal.
With the election of Zohran Mamdani as Mayor of New York City and Abdul El-Sayed as the Democratic nominee for Senate in Michigan, there appears to be a new form of “positive leftism” emerging among these DSA candidates. Their policy platforms focus much more intently on economic inequality, the cost of living, place-first politics, and a refusal to accept AIPAC campaign donations. This appears to be a potentially winning formula that has contributed to a progressive ascendancy within the Democratic Party.
I would classify Mamdani as a “positive social democrat” and El-Sayed as a “populist leftist”, given that El-Sayed is less explicit and quantitative in outlining his policy positions. Nevertheless, both candidates offer a unique brand of economically focused progressivism that left-leaning parties and candidates around the world would be wise to consider. It should be acknowledged from the outset that Mamdani and El-Sayed occupy very different electoral positions, with the former running as mayor and the latter for the Senate. Nevertheless, their electoral performances can provide evidence of the potential “transfederal” popularity of their shared policy platform.
Both men ran electoral campaigns that gave clear priority to affordability as their central electoral mandate. Mamdani pledged to New York City voters that he would introduce free bus fares, freeze rents for more than one million rent-stabilised and subsidised households, increase housing supply, and establish universal childcare. To fund these policies, Mamdani focused on a dual strategy of pre- and redistributive taxation, pledging to increase the minimum wage while simultaneously raising the corporate tax rate by close to 12% and introducing a 2% local wealth tax on citizens earning more than $1 million annually. While many political observers and New York City residents initially considered this strategy to be electoral suicide, particularly given New York City’s status as the wealthiest city in the United States and the world, it proved remarkably successful.
As a federal Senate candidate, El-Sayed has understandably focused on a broader economic policy platform. His proposals range from the Sanders-era Medicare for All, to labour reform and union revitalisation, education reform and increased teacher pay. He has also proposed specific protectionist measures to shield Michigan farmers from global competition, while capping and redistributing individual subsidy payments. Much like Mamdani, El-Sayed intends to fund these bold economic reforms through higher inheritance taxes, progressive taxation of wealth held in trusts, and increased marginal tax rates on millionaires and billionaires.El-Sayed has also placed a relatively strong emphasis on electoral reform during his Senate campaign. He proposes ending the Senate filibuster, limiting corporate money in election campaigns by supporting legislation to overturn the Citizens United Supreme Court decision, and reducing gerrymandering by delegating responsibility for electoral districting to a federal, non-partisan committee.
However, perhaps the greatest notoriety both Mamdani and El-Sayed received during their campaigns came from their positions on Israel-Palestine and international law. At a time when support for Israel has been diminishing in the United States, particularly among younger Americans, the DSA appears well positioned to capture additional votes from this emerging voting block. Mamdani gained significant attention on social media after openly stating that he would not visit Israel, instead prioritising his political efforts on New York City. This contrasted sharply with the other mayoral candidates, who openly stated that their first international engagement as mayor would be a visit to Israel. Likewise, El-Sayed has faced sustained questioning about his views on Israel’s right to exist and his foreign policy positions regarding Iran. He has handled these questions confidently in mainstream media interviews, repeatedly returning to the opportunity cost of foreign policy spending and arguing that resources devoted overseas could instead be directed towards improving the livelihoods of Michiganders.
The electoral results speak for themselves. Mamdani outcompeted a vastly more established, well-funded and experienced political operator in Andrew Cuomo in one of the most Jewish cities in the United States. El-Sayed, meanwhile, narrowly defeated Haley Stevens despite running a campaign with a budget of approximately $7 million compared with Stevens’ more than $60 million, over half of which reportedly came from AIPAC.
The combination of a renewed focus on cost-of-living concerns, economic reform and a legalistic foreign policy platform should therefore be considered a viable electoral strategy for the contemporary left. For years, the Democratic Party has struggled with its political identity and, throughout much of the Trump era, has largely mobilised against the political right rather than standing for a coherent set of ideals or policy prescriptions. The election of Mamdani as Mayor of New York City and the nomination of El-Sayed as the Democratic Senate candidate in Michigan should therefore be considered evidence of the potential global success of a this unique leftist campaign strategy.
